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Legal Phases of Professional Regulation *
* Address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, Septem­
ber 15, 1931, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
By Spencer Gordon
Your committee on arrangements has given me the subject of 
“Legal phases of professional regulation.” Although this is 
rather broad, I assume that you are interested primarily in the 
regulation of the profession of accountancy. This subject natu­
rally divides itself into what has been done and what is pro­
posed towards such regulation, and the further consideration 
of the validity or possible invalidity of enactments in that regard.
All of the states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, the 
Philippines and Porto Rico now have accountancy laws which 
limit the use of the term “certified public accountant ” to account­
ants upon whom this designation has been conferred by a state 
board as a result of examination or compliance with other require­
ments. Some states provide also for the use of the term “public 
accountant” only by accountants who were in practice before the 
enactment and who have registered as such.
Some of these statutes provide that the accountant, to be certi­
fied or registered, must be a resident of the state in question. 
Others provide that he must have a place for the regular transac­
tion of business in the state. Some require both residence and a 
place of business. Some require residence or a place of business. 
A few require that he be a citizen of the state.
Almost all of these statutes contain provision for the recognition 
of holders of certificates from other states. In some cases it is 
provided that the local board may in its discretion waive its ex­
amination, or that a certified public accountant from another state 
shall receive a certificate if the applicant’s state grants a similar 
privilege to a C. P. A. of the local state. In some, it is provided 
that a C. P. A. from another state may be admitted if the appli­
cant’s state has substantially or fully equivalent requirements for 
the C. P. A. certificate. In a few states a C. P. A. from another 
state may be admitted without qualification. Some of the states 
have requirements as to the experience of the C. P. A. from the 
foreign state, and in some cases it is required that the certificate 
holder first become a resident of the local state.
These statutes have to do with the use of the designation “certi­
fied public accountant” or “public accountant.” In only a few 
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instances have states as yet prohibited the practice of accountancy 
by persons not holding the certificate or not registered. A few of 
the statutes expressly provide that they are not to be construed 
as prohibiting the practice of accountancy. One statute states 
that it shall apply only to those holding themselves out as certified 
public accountants. Some statutes expressly provide that they 
are not to prevent unlicensed persons from acting as employees 
of accountants.
There are a few statutes, however, which purport to prohibit 
the practice of accountancy in the state by persons who have not 
qualified as certified public accountants or public accountants 
under the state law. There is, of course, a very substantial dif­
ference between a law which permits anyone to act in fact as a 
public accountant, but prohibits the use of the designation 
“certified public accountant” or “public accountant” except to 
those who have met the state’s requirements, and a law which 
prohibits entirely from practice a person who is not a certified 
public accountant or public accountant within the meaning of 
the state law.
Most of the statutes in regard to the use of the designation 
“certified public accountant” are silent as to accountants from 
another state entering for occasional professional employment. 
This silence is probably due to the fact that the statutes contain 
no prohibition of the practice of accountancy, so that the account­
ant who occasionally enters from another state, but has no 
office and issues no certificates in the local state, does not come 
in conflict with the laws restricting the use of the words “certified 
public accountant” or “public accountant.” Some of these 
statutes expressly state that they do not prohibit temporary en­
gagements within the state. Even the states which prohibit the 
practice of accountancy except to those who have complied with 
the requirements of certification or registration have provisions 
allowing the entry of accountants from other states to fulfill 
specific engagements. One such statute provides for a temporary 
certificate to enable the fulfilling of specific engagements, 
the contracts for which were entered into outside of the 
state. Another expressly provides that it does not prohibit the 
entry of accountants from other states in pursuance of en­
gagements originating from without the state. A third does 
not prohibit temporary engagements incident to practice in the 
state of domicile, provided the appointment of an agent for service 
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of process is made five days before commencing work in the state. 
These statutes, however, appear to have no provision for the non­
resident accountant, who is not a C. P. A., entering the state for 
temporary engagements.
It should be noted, however, that by some of the statutes the 
non-resident accountant is prohibited from opening an office in 
the state or from practising continuously therein by the restriction 
against permanent practice by those who have not been given the 
state certificate plus the requirement that the certificate can be 
applied for only by residents. Bills providing for similar legisla­
tion are under consideration by other state legislatures. Another 
discrimination against non-residents is to require that all parties 
in a firm practising as such in a state secure state certificates.
This represents the present state of the law throughout the states. 
The question of the validity of these provisions may logically be 
treated under three headings which are of progressive difficulty:
1. The validity of state laws restricting the use of the words 
“certified public accountant” or “public accountant.”
2. The validity of state laws prohibiting practice within the 
state except by those who have qualified as certified public ac­
countants or public accountants.
3. The validity of state laws which make residence or citizen­
ship a requirement for qualification as a certified public account­
ant or public accountant, and restrict practice within the state to 
persons who are so qualified, or impose other restrictions which 
apply only to non-residents.
A state law is valid unless it conflicts with the Constitution of 
the United States or with the constitution of the state in question. 
I shall consider these statutes from the viewpoint of the constitu­
tion of the United States, because it would be equivalent to writing 
and reading an encyclopaedia for me to attempt an address based 
on the differing constitutions of forty-eight states.
But when the contention is made that an accountancy law is 
unconstitutional, the contestant would probably rely on the 
following provisions of the constitution of the United States:
“The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several states.” (Clause 1, article 4, 
section 2.)
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
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any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.” (14th amendment, section 1.)
In general it may be assumed that the right to practise account­
ancy is a property right and a privilege or immunity within these 
provisions, but this right, privilege or immunity must yield to the 
police power of the state if the police power is exercised upon a 
reasonable basis. Constitutional questions arising under these 
sections thus involve questions of degree and are difficult of 
solution. I
The state laws restricting the use of the words “certified public 
accountant” or “public accountant” have now been in effect for 
a considerable time. They have come before the courts in a 
number of cases, and I think it can be said with a fair degree of 
certainty that there is nothing unconstitutional in a statute which 
creates a state board with power to give reasonable examinations 
or enforce other reasonable requirements as a result of which per­
sons will be given the right to the designation of “certified public 
accountant,” and prohibiting the use of such designation by all 
others, or requiring accountants who are already in practice 
to register as such in order to use the term “public accountant.”
ii
When we consider, however, the statutes which purport to 
prohibit entirely the practice of public accountancy by persons 
who have not met these requirements, we are confronted with a 
more difficult problem. It would seem reasonable to provide that 
an accountant may not call himself a “certified public account­
ant” or even a “public accountant” when he has not in fact been 
so certified by the state board nor conformed to the requirements 
for “public accountants,” but it is not so clear that the state may 
deprive of his means of livelihood a man who has not received 
the state certificate or so qualified.
There have been two decisions where restrictive statutes have 
been declared in violation of constitutional provisions. In State 
v. Riedell, 109 Okla. 35 (1924), a statute which prohibited an 
uncertified accountant from engaging in practice was held to 
violate the provisions of the constitutions of the United States and 
of the state of Oklahoma. The court said:
“Our conclusion, therefore, is that the act, in so far as it pro­
hibits uncertified accountants from holding themselves out as 
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professional or expert accountants or auditors for compensation or 
engaging in the practice of that profession, is in conflict with the 
spirit and express provision of the constitution and void, in this, 
that it abridges the right of private property and infringes upon 
the right of contract in matters purely of private concern, bearing 
no perceptible relation to the general or public welfare, and 
thereby tends to create a monopoly in the profession of account­
ancy for the benefit of certified accountants, and denies to un­
certified accountants the equal protection of the laws, and the 
enjoyment of the gains of their own industry. The defendants 
are not engaged in the exercise of a franchise, but a constitution­
ally guaranteed right.”
In Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253 (1926), a similar Illinois statute 
was held unconstitutional. The court referred to provisions of 
the constitution of Illinois similar to those of the federal constitu­
tion. The case is illuminating in the precise statement of the 
court as to how far such a statute may go:
“We do not say that it is beyond the power of the general 
assembly to enact a statute requiring that no one shall use the 
term ‘ certified public accountant ’ or the term ‘ public accountant ’ 
without having met the requirements of such an act. Such a 
provision may well be within the power of the legislature on the 
ground that it is to the public interest that no one shall use a 
term indicating that he has been examined and certified as an 
accountant when such is not the fact. . . . Such is a misrepre­
sentation which the legislature may prevent by statute. There 
is, as we view it, however, a wide difference between acts of such 
character and one which provides that no one who has not re­
ceived a certificate as public accountant from the department of 
registration and education shall be allowed to work at the busi­
ness or occupation of accountancy for more than one person. 
Such an act does not spring from a demand for the protection of 
the public welfare but is an unwarranted regulation of private 
business and the right of the citizen to pursue the ordinary occu­
pations of life.”
These decisions might not necessarily be followed in other 
states, for a strong argument can be made that the practice of pub­
lic accountancy does affect the public welfare and is not a private 
business. There have been decisions of many courts holding that 
statutes prohibiting the practice of various other professions and 
occupations by persons not licensed by a state board, after com­
pliance with reasonable tests, are constitutional, on the ground 
that the right to earn a livelihood may be limited by a statute 
which is a reasonable exercise of the police power of a state. Such 
decisions can be found as to architects, barbers, dentists, locomo­
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tive engineers, motion picture machine operators, pharmacists, 
physicians and plumbers. The Oklahoma and Illinois courts dis­
tinguished these cases on the ground that the occupations in ques­
tion affected the public health and safety, but it can be argued 
forcefully that the same power which permits the state to safe­
guard the health of the public also will permit the state to safe­
guard the pocketbooks of the public.
Thus, in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, in which the 
supreme court of the United States held that a state statute 
requiring physicians to procure certificates was not unconsti­
tutional, the reasons given appear broad enough to cover public 
accountancy:
“But there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right (to practise 
medicine) where its exercise is not permitted because of a failure 
to comply with conditions imposed by the state for the protection 
of society. The power of the state to provide for the general 
welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations 
as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the 
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception 
and fraud. . . . The nature and extent of the qualifications re­
quired must depend primarily upon the judgment of the state 
as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or 
profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no 
objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency 
or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such calling 
or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and 
application that they can operate to deprive one of his right to 
pursue a lawful vocation.
“. . . Every one may have occasion to consult him, but com­
paratively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill 
which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurance 
given by his licence, issued by an authority competent to judge 
in that respect that he possesses the requisite qualifications.”
This opinion of the United States supreme court can be para­
phrased to apply to the profession of accountancy. Its regulation 
will tend to secure the people of the state against the consequences 
of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud. 
Everyone may have occasion to consult the accountant, but few 
can judge of his qualifications, so that they must rely upon the 
assurance given by his licence. It can thus be argued that the 
accountant subjects himself to reasonable regulation by holding 
himself out to the public as having professional qualifications, and 
that there is no logical distinction between the regulation of the 
physician who deals with physical health and the regulation of the
365
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accountant who deals with financial health. Thus, in Holsman v. 
Thomas, 112 Ohio state 397 (1925), the Ohio supreme court held 
valid an ordinance regulating auctioneers, saying:
“Now, the police power relates not merely to the public health 
and to public physical safety, but also to public financial safety.”
The Oklahoma and Illinois decisions holding that the practice 
of accountancy can not be regulated seem also to ignore the fact 
that the regulation of lawyers is not confined to practice before 
the courts, but extends to the giving of professional advice, in 
which there is now a decided similarity between the function of 
the lawyer and accountant. Certainly neither profession has to 
do with public health—both deal with property. Many states 
also require dealers in securities to obtain licences upon satis­
factory evidence of the good business repute of the applicants and 
their agents, revocable on evidence of bad repute. The constitu­
tionality of these laws was assailed on the ground that they were 
an illegal control of private concerns, but the statutes have been 
sustained by the state courts and by the United States supreme 
court, and are in effect today as the well known “blue sky laws.” 
The police power of the state which was invoked in these laws was 
concerned directly with the protection of the property of the 
people of the state—the blue sky laws had nothing to do with the 
public health.
I feel, therefore, that the Oklahoma and Illinois decisions do not 
necessarily settle the question, and that a law restricting the 
practice of public accountancy to persons who hold the state 
certificate might in other states and by the United States supreme 
court be held not to conflict with the federal constitution, on the 
ground that the practice of public accountancy is one which 
affects the people of the state generally and may therefore be 
regulated in a reasonable way in proper exercise of the police 
power. Such a law could perhaps prohibit the use of the words 
“certified public accountant” or even “accountant” on the 
stationery of an uncertified or unlicensed person, or on the door 
of his office, or the holding out to the public that he is a certified 
public accountant or even an accountant, or the giving of an opin­
ion in writing certifying as to any accounting matters and pur­
porting to be made by a certified public accountant or by an 
accountant. But it would be much more difficult to sustain a law 
which went beyond the restriction of the public practice of ac­
countancy or forbade the private employment of a person 
366
Legal Phases of Professional Regulation
by another person to do bookkeeping, give financial advice 
or do anything else that is done by accountants. The law 
must restrict only the public practice of accountancy if the 
argument that I have suggested in favor of its constitutionality 
is to apply.
To summarize: laws prohibiting entirely the practice of public 
accountancy by persons who have not met the statutory require­
ments have been held unconstitutional by the highest courts of 
Oklahoma and Illinois. There are no decisions holding such laws 
constitutional. The question, however, can not be considered 
settled, as there are several states which have similar restrictive 
legislation the validity of which has not been tested, and a strong 
argument can be made that such laws are a valid exercise of the 
police power if they do not go beyond the regulation of the prac­
tice of accountancy in its public aspects.
III
We now come to the question of the validity of state laws which 
make residence or citizenship a requirement for qualification as a 
certified public accountant or public accountant, and restrict 
practice within the state to persons who are so qualified, or 
impose other restrictions which apply only to non-residents. Can 
the state give its residents an advantage in the practice of account­
ancy over non-residents?
Of course, if the Oklahoma and Illinois decisions are correct 
and a state can not prevent the practice of public accountancy 
by an uncertified person, then this final question does not arise. 
Any non-resident accountant who is dissatisfied with the difficul­
ties put in the way of his practice would include among his con­
tentions the broad one that the state had no right to restrict 
accountancy practice at all either as to residents or non-residents. 
As this point has been discussed, I shall pass to questions peculiar 
to the distinction between residents and non-residents.
If the state can constitutionally restrict only the practice of 
public accountancy as opposed to private employment, as was 
suggested under the last heading, it can be argued that the isolated 
act of a non-resident in entering a state temporarily to make an 
audit as a result of an outside employment would not be a proper 
subject of restriction, on the ground that the accountant who has 
no office in the state, who does not habitually practise in the 
state and issues no certificates in the state or to residents of 
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the state, does not hold himself out to the public of the state as 
being a public accountant. Some state statutes do, however, 
purport to restrict this sort of practice. I know of no decision on 
the precise point.
Let us now consider the non-resident accountant who wishes 
to practise frequently in the state, to open an office in the state, 
to qualify as a certified public accountant of the state or to be 
a member of a firm which has an office in the state. Does an 
accountancy law which discriminates against such a non-resident 
abridge his privileges and immunities, deprive him of property 
or deny him the equal protection of the laws? Time does not 
permit a detailed discussion of the construction that has been 
given these constitutional provisions. Perhaps the simplest 
statement that can be made is that the police power of the state 
may be exercised in a reasonable way without infringing them. 
The problem, therefore, would be whether or not a requirement of 
residence in the state bears such a reasonable relation to the 
protection of the public in the regulation of the practice of public 
accountancy that inclusion of such a requirement in a statute is 
a reasonable exercise of the police power. Although there is a 
decided conflict in the decisions, the United States supreme court 
case which seems to be the closest would indicate that such a 
distinction may be made between residents and non-residents. 
But if all the facts in regard to the practice of accountancy were 
brought before the court it might well result in a contrary holding, 
on the ground that there is no reasonable basis for discrimination 
against non-resident accountants.
The argument in favor of the constitutionality of a law dis­
criminating against non-residents might run somewhat along the 
following lines:—The examining board can better determine the 
moral character, standing and ability of residents. A resident 
accountant can do better work because of his knowledge of local 
conditions. The disgrace resulting from discovery in a dishonest 
act would be a more powerful deterrent upon a resident account­
ant. The board can more effectively control residents. Process 
can be more readily served upon a resident. Damages can be 
more readily collected from a resident.
But these arguments, which have been made in regard to other 
occupations, can be opposed with considerable force when applied 
to the present practice of accountancy. It may be argued in reply 
that the board can, in fact, determine the character of and can 
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control both residents and non-residents, that a knowledge of 
local conditions such as could not be obtained by a non-resident is 
seldom necessary to the practice of modern accountancy, that 
discovery of a dishonest act wherever committed would injure 
the accountant wherever located, that provision could be made 
that a non-resident must appoint an agent for service of process, 
and that whether damages could more readily be collected from a 
resident or non-resident would be problematical in each case.
Passage of laws discriminating against the non-resident ac­
countant seems to be in opposition to the nationalization of 
business which is constantly increasing and which has been so 
ably described by Mr. Peloubet. (See The Journal of Ac­
countancy, October, 1931.) Consider, for example, the 
metropolitan area of New York. It would hardly seem in ac­
cordance with present realities if a law could impose a barrier 
between those parts of New Jersey, New York and Connecticut 
which lie in that area. There is reasonable ground for contending 
that no purpose can be found for legislation which discriminates 
between the resident and non-resident accountant, other than 
the purpose of protecting the local field for the local accountant, 
and if this could be demonstrated the statute could hardly be 
sustained under the police power. While involving a discrimina­
tion within the state, the decision in Sayre Borough v. Phillips, 
148 Pa. 482 (1892), is interesting in that regard. An ordinance of 
the borough prohibiting non-residents from peddling was declared 
invalid, the court saying:
“That the resident dealer and peddler may enjoy a larger trade, 
the non-resident peddler is shut out. If the borough authorities 
may lawfully regulate the business of peddling for the benefit of 
residents, we see no reason why they may not lay their hands in 
like manner on every department of trade and of professional 
labor, and protect the village lawyer and doctor as well as the 
village grocer and peddler. . . .
“The present question is whether, under the pretense of police 
control, trade may be regulated in the interest of resident dealers 
by making the same business a lawful one to all who live on one 
side of a municipal line, and an unlawful one to all who live on 
the other side. We are very clear in our convictions that this 
can not be done, ...”
The difficulty of reconciling the decisions of the federal courts 
will appear from the statement of a few of them. Statutes have 
been held constitutional in the following cases:—Where resident 
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property owners were given the right to stop improvements and 
assessments by filing protest, with no similar right to non-resident 
property owners. Where personal service was required on resi­
dent owners of land, and service by publication only on non­
residents. Where resident and non-resident decedents were 
taxed at different rates. Where the statute of limitations was 
longer in the case of a resident. Where residents were given 
greater dower rights than non-residents. Where the use of a 
state highway by non-resident automobilists was declared equiv­
alent to the appointment of the registrar of motor vehicles as agent 
for service of process. Where a court was authorized to dismiss 
in its discretion a suit brought by a non-resident against a foreign 
corporation but was not authorized so to dismiss a suit brought 
by a resident against a foreign corporation. Where a non-resident 
was required to give bond for costs not required of a resident.
On the other hand, the following statutes have been declared 
unconstitutional:—Where a lower scale of licence fees was provided 
for resident traders than for non-residents. Where residents were 
given priority in distribution of assets of foreign corporations. 
Where a higher privilege tax was imposed on companies having 
their chief office outside the state. Where it was provided that 
no one might be licensed as a peddler who had not resided in the 
state for one year. Where residents only were permitted to be 
appointed trustees by deed. Where non-residents were denied 
the right to obtain licences as stationary engineers. Where a 
higher licence tax was imposed on non-resident bakeries than on 
resident bakeries.
The case which probably would be most strongly relied upon in 
any argument in favor of the constitutionality of an accountancy 
law discriminating against non-residents is La Tourette v. Mc­
Master, 248 U. S. 465, decided in 1919, where a law limiting to 
residents of South Carolina the right to engage in the insurance 
brokerage business was held constitutional in a proceeding brought 
by a non-resident who contended that the law as applied to him 
was unconstitutional, the court saying:
“' It is important for the protection of the interests of the people 
of the state that the business should be in the hands of competent 
and trustworthy persons.’ And we may say that this result can 
be more confidently and completely secured through resident 
brokers, they being immediately under the inspection of the 
commissioner of insurance.”
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The close analogy between this case and a case limiting to resi­
dents the right to practise public accountancy will readily be 
observed. On the other hand, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 
as recently as 1927 there appeared the following statement by Mr. 
Justice Butler:
“But a state may not withhold from non-resident individuals 
the right of doing business therein.”
My own feeling is that if there came to the United States 
supreme court a case involving a discrimination by state law against 
non-resident accountants, the court’s decision would depend upon 
the showing in regard to the present practice of accountancy and 
the reasonableness of the particular statute as to that particular 
profession. There is always a presumption that a law is consti­
tutional, and a strong fact presentation showing the unreasonable­
ness of the statute in question would have to be made in order to 
overcome this presumption. The present attitude of the supreme 
court in that regard is stated in O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford 
Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, decided in 1931, and sustaining a state law 
forbidding any insurer licensed in the state to allow a commission 
in excess of a reasonable amount. The court there said:
“The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly 
within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it 
void on the ground that the specific method of regulation pre­
scribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due 
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition 
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the pre­
sumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some 
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. It 
does not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of 
which the court must take judicial notice, that in New Jersey 
evils did not exist in the business of fire insurance for which this 
statutory provision was an appropriate remedy.”
Thus an accountant wishing to obtain a decision that a statute 
discriminating against non-residents is unconstitutional should 
attempt to show that the restriction of the right to practise ac­
countancy to residents only or discriminating against non-resi­
dents is not a reasonable way to deal with the evils of dishonest, 
careless or incompetent accountancy. A basis for such a showing 
might be found in records of accounting societies, articles on the 
subject by eminent accountants and testimony given in court 
as to the present practices in the accounting profession. Those 
wishing to maintain the constitutionality of such a law and to re­
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inforce the presumption of constitutionality which always exists 
could use the same sort of evidence to the extent that it would be 
helpful to them. I think that the delivery of Mr. Peloubet’s 
address is an important step in the creation of a literature on this 
subject, and I hope that other accountants will be alert to gather 
material and will express and publish their views.
As I have stated, the views expressed in this paper have been 
concerned with the provisions of the federal constitution. In 
any case which may arise the provisions of the constitution of the 
state in question should be studied with great care. The Illinois 
decision which I have discussed turned in part upon the violation 
of provisions of the Illinois constitution prohibiting the granting 
of special privileges.
I hope you will not be too much disappointed by the apparent 
inconclusiveness of this paper. I can not tell you whether or not 
an untested law is constitutional. That is only known when the 
court of last resort has spoken; and many times there are five 
judges on one side and four on the other. How can anyone pre­
dict who will be the infallible five? All that we can do in difficult 
questions of this sort is to indicate trends, to suggest arguments 
that may be made on either side, to collect the decisions which 
seem most analogous, and to make suggestions as to the method 
of showing the courts what are the true facts in regard to the pres­
ent practice of accountancy. I can only hope that this paper will 
constitute some contribution to the solution of the problems.
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